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WORLD REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS

General Western Reaction

The content of President Eisenhower's foreign policy statement, its timing, and the prestige of the man who delivered it, made it one of the most effective messages for world-wide impact since World War II.

The leading Western nations have acknowledged that United States foreign policy seeks a relaxation of international tension and a workable formula for world peace.

The free world generally acclaimed the address as a positive reaffirmation of Western aspirations and a victory for the US in assuming the initiative for world peace.

A few adverse comments among our allies were based on local, short range considerations or resulted from a feeling of having been by-passed in the planning stage for a major step in the field of foreign policy.

Soviet Bloc

Soviet reaction, although unofficial, was unprecedented in its quickness. Within a few hours after the speech, the New York TASS summary, with some comment, was published in Pravda and broadcast by Radio Moscow. Quick Kremlin approval of the TASS coverage was evidently due to the fact that it did not compromise the current Soviet "peace" tactics, or any



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which support the Soviet thesis regarding peaceful coexistence. It also pointed out omitted items which would support the Kremlin's policy but would not necessarily be considered prerequisites for the opening of negotiations, - such as the recognition of China, and consideration of the Potsdam Agreement regarding the German question.

Other Communist accusations -- mostly non-Orbit -- attached stereotyped comments to the <u>TASS</u> communique in such a way that they could supplement any future Moscow reaction. For instance, President Eisenhower was charged with having:

- (1) Failed to "comply with the Soviet bid to meet the USSR half way;"
- (2) Evidenced that he wants not peace but the fruits of victory;
- (3) Proved that there is to be no change in his Government's "civilizing crusade," i.e., the policy of "liberating" Eastern Europe;
- (4) Reiterated the program of American imperialism.

 The Kremlin could make propaganda gains by playing up the US desire for peace negotiations as a "capitulation" to Soviet offers. This theme has already been adopted by some Communist propaganda media.

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Eastern Europe

Satellite media closely followed the Moscow pattern in transmitting the $\overline{\text{TASS}}$ account at least once on Friday and Saturday.

A report from the US Legation in Budapest indicated that the speech made a strong and favorable impression on Hungarian listeners. The report said that many listeners had wept and prayed during the reading of the Hungarian translation of the speech. An informant said that the Hungarian press office had copies in the hands of top government and party officials within two hours.

Yugoslav officials went out of their way to praise the address. Marshal Tito considered it "the finest thing he (President Eisenhower) has done." He described it as beautifully timed, and felt that it would probably produce positive results in Korea. However, he was doubtful about Austria and thought it unlikely that the Russians would deal with the US — at least for some time — on Germany, the heart of the European question.

Western Europe

Official comment in West European capitals has unanimously approved President Eisenhower's speech as a contribution to world peace. The reaction in non-Communist media has been generally favorable, ranging from moderate approval through enthusiasm.

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The President's definite proposals for a peace settlement, the assumption of initiative by the United States, and the challenge to the Soviet Union to clarify its real position all were emphasized. The press in some countries singled out the President's remarks on points on particular local interest.

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Two considerations provoked adverse comment in Western Europe. Both French and Dutch papers criticized the failure of the President to consult his allies before taking such a major foreign policy step. In sharp contrast to Churchill's strong endorsement is Bevan's charge that Mr. Eisenhower demanded too much from the Soviet Union and conceded too little.

Editorials appearing in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and West Germany have pointed out that the conditions laid down in the Eisenhower speech are not likely to be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and should not be set up as "irreducible goals."

Near and Middle East

Middle Eastern reaction was generally highly favorable.

The conservative French Moroccan press hailed the speech as a "capital document" and stated that Eisenhower has the Kremlin's "back against the wall." It carried extensive direct

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quotes. Similarly, the Cairo papers used the speech as Friday's major story and the major Arabic dailies reprinted the full text. The Egyptian state broadcasting service presented the full text simultaneously with the delivery in Washington and broadcast shortwave summaries in Greek, French, Italian and Arabic. The Greek Foreign Minister stated that it was now "up to the Soviet Union to respond to the Eisenhower proposal and thus afford proof of its peaceful dispositions." He expressed particular pleasure with the reference to the independence of the East European satellites and their right to free elections. The Turkish radio regarded the speech as a challenge to the Soviet leaders to offer deeds instead of words, and said that they must now answer Eisenhower's...."frank questions with the same frankness." The comment received thus far from Iran has been favorable.

Afghan representatives at the UN joined other Near Eastern delegations in viewing the speech as an honest and worthwhile contribution toward easing world tension. They felt that it would have a favorable reception in the underdeveloped countries.

The Indian Ambassador in Cairo told Ambassador Caffery that "He has gone more than half-way. No other living man could have done it." However, in India, press reaction and broadcasts over the government-controlled radio supported the view that the US is as guilty as the USSR for the present

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fear and distrust in the world. The US was called upon as much as the USSR to 'prove by deeds rather than words that it really wants peace." The Indian press gave the Orbit credit for the initiative in making recent peace overtures.

In Ceylon, the press stated that the West could not be blamed for being suspicious of Soviet actions, and that the speech should clear the air. It was stated that world peace could not be guaranteed until the USSR renounced its interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Far East 25X6A

Over-all reaction has been very favorable, the speech being generally viewed as a clear statement of American objectives that required the Soviet Union to demonstrate its sincerity. There was little optimism that the Soviet response would be favorable.

There has been no immediate comment from South Korean leaders. They have long insisted that only "peace through victory" and unification under South Korean domination offer any firm basis for settlement of major issues. President Rhee's press secretary noted that while South Korea appreciated Eisenhower's peace efforts, no honorable armistice would be possible until all Chinese troops retired to Manchuria. The press has previously demanded that the Soviet Union show its sincerity by agreeing to unification and UN-supervised nation-wide elections.

There has been no North Korean reaction.

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China and S. E. Asia

Chinese Nationalist officials were disappointed over the omission of references to China and Formosa. Some officials connected this with recent reports that the United States was contemplating a UN trusteeship over Formosa. They expressed fear that Formosa might be sacrificed in an overall US-USSR understanding. Nationalist leaders were reported to take the view that omission of China meant that the President did not recognize the Communist conquest of the mainland and wished to leave the Nationalists free to attempt its recovery.

The Chinese Communists have not yet originated comment.

Peiping Radio on 18 April broadcast the text of the TASS report, including the statement that "Eisenhower made no mention whatever of China and of restoring her reasonable rights..."

The "rights" previously demanded by Peiping include sovereignty over Formosa and occupancy of China's seat in the UN.

There has been no extensive comment on the speech in Southeast Asia. Although no Malayan reaction has as yet been received, the Vietnamese Premier and Australian and Philippine officials gave it hearty approval.

Probable Soviet Reaction

The world-wide distribution of the address at the diplomatic level almost demands an official reply from the

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Kremlin. We feel that Moscow would weigh carefully the propaganda advantages of an immediate or a deferred reply.

The more important factors Moscow would probably consider regarding an immediate statement would include:

- (1) The necessity for further signs of Soviet sincerity in Korea;
- (2) Maintenance of the initiative in the "peace" campaign;
- (3) The possibility of losing face in the Communist camp.

On the other hand, there are a number of factors which would favor a delayed response. These include:

- (1) An opportunity to gain world-wide attention and a well-coordinated line on May Day. A maximum effort could be mounted to regain the peace initiative.
- (2) Time to consider an effective countermeasure.
- (3) Avoidance of tipping Moscow's hand prior to the forthcoming NATO conference.
- (4) Use of the already agreed-upon Korean negotiations as a means of dissipating the effectiveness of the American move.